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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a Kansas District Court decided In the Matter of the Estate of
Waldschmidt, a case that, if upheld, could potentially change the landscape of heirship
determinations in Kansas for generations.1 As a case of first impression in Kansas, the
Waldschmidt decision raises several ripe issues: (1) whether a Ross hearing, the judicial
imposition of a best interest of the child analysis as a precursor to ordering a genetic test
to determine paternity,2 should apply to an adult; (2) whether a Ross hearing should apply
in the context of an intestate estate; and (3) whether the Kansas Probate Code should
defer heirship challenges to the Kansas Parentage Act. This article will argue that in
addressing these issues, the Waldschmidt court made several errors.

Initially, the

Waldschmidt court wrongfully expanded the best interest of the child standard to include
its application to adults, because it ignored the limited scope of In re Marriage of Ross.3
Next, the Waldschmidt court improperly applied the best interest of the child standard in
the context of an intestate estate, because the court ignored the contrasting purposes of
the Kansas Probate Code and Kansas Parentage Act. Moreover, the Waldschmidt court
failed to recognize nontraditional family arrangements in the arena of intestate estates and
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failed to properly utilize technological advances to efficiently and effectively resolve
heirship challenges.
Before a discussion of these issues, one must understand the facts of
Waldschmidt. Waldschmidt died intestate, survived by his wife. While the surviving
wife appeared to be his sole heir, a thirty-three year old woman born during the marriage
of Waldschmidt and his first wife, also made claim to his estate.4 Other evidence,
however, suggested that Waldschmidt did not father the claimant. Consequently, the
surviving wife petitioned for genetic testing to determine the claimant’s true paternity.
The claimant then filed a separate paternity action, seeking the shelter of a Ross hearing
against genetic testing.5 The court held that Waldschmidt was the presumed father
because of the claimant’s birth during the first marriage6 and found that under Ross it was
against the claimant’s best interest to have a genetic test performed that might rebut the
presumption of Waldschmidt’s paternity. This conclusion relegated the surviving spouse
to share the estate equally with the claimant.7
This article will focus on the issues presented in Waldschmidt in four parts. First,
this article will explore how situations like Waldschmidt arise under the Kansas Probate
Code and its deference to the Kansas Parentage Act and Ross. Second, this article will
dissect the increasing occurrence of nontraditional family situations like Waldschmidt and
its impact on the law. Third, this article will analyze the improper application of a Ross
hearing to an adult and in the context of an intestate estate. Finally, this article will
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propose a uniform solution that incorporates the advent of scientific technology while
still giving preference to testator intent.
II. STATUTORY SCHEME & THE ROSS BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD
A. Kansas Probate Code and Kansas Parentage Act.
Under the Kansas Probate Code, if a claimant is adjudicated the child of the
decedent, then one-half of the estate would pass to the surviving spouse and one-half
would pass to the claimant.8 If there is a surviving spouse, but no children, however, the
entire estate passes to the surviving spouse.9 Thus, one can easily see that the correct
determination of heirship is critical, especially when a large estate is at issue.
Determining the proper heirship, however, has not proven easy. The Kansas Probate
Code defines “children” for purposes of intestate succession as “biological children,
including a posthumous child; children adopted as provided by law; and children whose
parentage is or has been determined under the Kansas parentage act or prior law.”10 This
definition supplies the only guidance for determining heirship among children of a
decedent under the Kansas Probate Code. Consequently, deferring heirship challenges to
the Kansas Parentage Act creates quite a quandary in that it allows for the adjudication of
heirship rights by non-probate standards.
In 1985, Kansas adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973.11 The Kansas
Parentage Act contains several presumptions of paternity, such as the presumption used
in Waldschmidt that, “a man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . the man and the
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child’s mother are, or have been, married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage.”12 A presentation of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, however,
rebuts these presumptions.13

Although the Parentage Act allows for a litany of

admissible evidence to rebut a presumption of paternity,14 genetic testing arguably
provides the most conclusive evidence.15 In fact, the Kansas Parentage Act appears to
give preference to genetic testing. The Act provides that when evaluating paternity in
any action, including probate proceedings, “the court, upon its own motion or upon
motion of any party to the action or proceeding, shall order the mother, child and alleged
father to submit to genetic tests.”16

The Kansas Supreme Court decision in Ross,

however, complicated the obtainment of such genetic testing.
B. Creation of the Ross best interest of the child standard.
The law regarding determinations of paternity has evolved dramatically.
Historically, Kansas courts applied a 1777 English doctrine called the Lord Mansfield
Rule.17 This Rule established one of the most ancient and strongest presumptions known
to law – that a child born in wedlock is the child of the husband and wife.18 Under this
presumption, the husband and wife “shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they
have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious.”19 In the 1926
decision of Lynch v. Rosenberger, however, the Kansas Supreme Court overturned the
12

Id. §38-1114(a)(1).
Id. §38-1114(b).
14
See Id. §38- 1119 (outlining that evidence relating to paternity may include evidence of sexual intercourse
during the time of conception, an expert’s opinion concerning the statistical probability of the alleged
father’s paternity based on the duration of the pregnancy, genetic tests, medical or anthropological
evidence, physician’s records, testimony relating to sexual access to the mother by another man at the
probable time of the conception, and birth weight).
15
See infra notes 47-51 with accompanying text.
16
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Stillie v. Stillie, 129 Kan. 19, 281 P. 925 (1929) (elsewhere reported as Martin v. Stillie, 281 P. 925).
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Lord Mansfield Rule, declaring it “artificial and unsound.”20 This ruling opened the door
for presentation of the “best evidence” of paternity.21 Therefore, the Lynch decision
advances the same principle presently contained in the Kansas Parentage Act provision
that allows for a rebuttable presumption of paternity by “clear and convincing
evidence.”22 Recent decisions, such as Ross, however, obstruct the utilization of the
“best evidence” to rebut paternity – namely, genetic testing.
In 1989, the Kansas Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Ross, holding that
a best interest of the child analysis must be conducted before a genetic test to determine
paternity will be ordered.23 This has commonly become known as the “Ross hearing.”
The Ross court took the position that the rights of the child, parent, and state, were best
protected by the imposition of a best interest of the child standard.24 In particular, the
court adopted the standard in an effort to protect the emotional and physical stability of
minor children from warring parents, because as the court observed, a paternity suit, by
its very nature, threatens the stability of a child’s world.25 Rather than risk the disruption
potentially caused if scientific evidence proved non-paternity, Ross reasoned that the
status quo presumption of paternity would better protect a child’s environment.26 In other
words, the Ross court followed a policy against bastardizing presumably legitimate
children.27

20

Lynch v. Rosenberger, 121 Kan. 601, 249 P. 682, 684 (1926).
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Id. at 601-02.
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Id. at 602. (following McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 310-11 (1987)).
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Id. at 601-02; see also, Sheila Reynolds, Challenging the Presumption of Paternity, 65 DEC. J. KAN. BAR
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As a means of accomplishing this end, the Ross hearing gives a judge discretion
to consider various factors in determining a child’s best interest. Decisions subsequent to
Ross more clearly articulated the factors considered during the hearing to include: (1)
whether the presumed father and child have established a relationship; (2) whether the
presumed father wants to continue to serve as the primary parent by providing financial
and emotional support; (3) if the presumed father is determined to not be the father,
whether another man can be determined to be the father; (4) who the child believes their
father to be, and the emotional impact if they were to be proven wrong; (5) the mother’s
position on the issue and her motives; (6) who was married to the mother when the child
was born; (7) whether there has been an acknowledgment of paternity in any writing,
birth certificate, or contract; and (8) whether there has been an order to pay child
support.28 Thus, by imposing a factual inquiry that includes these considerations, Ross
and its progeny altered the procedure of paternity actions in Kansas.29
The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, the version adopted by Kansas, did not
contemplate a best interest of the child standard.30 In a sense, then, the Ross court
undertook the role of the legislature by constructing the Ross hearing as a roadblock in
the path of rebutting paternity. Moreover, the imposition of a Ross hearing undermined
the Lynch decision, which allowed for the “best evidence” in a paternity suit. The
Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 also contains a provision consistent with a best interest of
the child standard, which acts as a mechanism for courts to deny a Motion for Genetic

28

Reynolds, supra note 26, at 39-40 (citing Jensen v. Runft, 252 Kan. 76 (1992) and In re D.B.S., 20 Kan.
App. 2d 438 (1995)).
29
Kristin Blomquist-Shinn, Family Law: A New Requirement for Paternity Determinations in Kansas –
Determining if Blood Tests are in the Best Interest of the Child, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 112, 115 (Fall 1990).
30
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-1110 et seq.
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Testing based on a finding of the best interest of the child.31 A Ross hearing, or the
substantial equivalent, is now the standard followed in at least thirteen states,32 by either
common law creation33 or adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000.34 Therefore,
it is only a matter of time before a situation like Waldschmidt occurs again, an added
reason to be sure the law is applied correctly.
III. CHANGES IN THE LANDSCAPE OF SOCIETY AND THE LAW
In circumstances such as an intestate distribution, should the court focus on the
best interest of the child, or should it focus on biological accuracy? As discussed below,
the traditional meaning of “family” is no longer reality,35 the stigma of bastardization is
weakened,36 and genetic testing has become a foolproof method of establishing
paternity;37 however, Waldschmidt, Ross, and other cases, ignore these truths and rule in
favor of a judicially determined equity.38 Thus, given the changes in the definition of
“family” and the advent of biological technology, legislatures must develop and courts
must apply a uniform procedure to address the growing number of difficult situations like
that in Waldschmidt.

31

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT OF 2000 §608, Authority to Deny Motion for Genetic Testing.
Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W.Va. 399 (1989) (following best interest of child standard); C.C. v.
A.B., 406 Mass. 679 (1990) (following Ross and McDaniels); Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196 (1991)
(following Ross and McDaniels); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420 (1991) (following Ross); Kelly v.
Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. App. 1992) (following best interest of child standard); Jones v. Trojak,
535 Pa. 95 (1993) (following Ross); Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Privette, 617 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1993)
(following Ross); Matter of Paternity of Adam, 273 Mont. 351 (1995) (following best interest of child
standard); Tedford v. Gregory, 125 N.M. 206 (1998) (following best interest of child standard); Langston v.
Riffe, 359 Md. 396 (2000) (following Ross and McDaniels); N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000)
(following Ross).
33
Just two years after the Ross decision, C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679 (1990) and Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz.
196 (1991) both entered opinions adopting a best interest of the child standard consistent with Ross and
McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299 (1987).
34
Delaware, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000.
35
See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
36
See infra note 45.
37
See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
38
See supra notes 1-2 & 23-29 and accompanying text; see also infra note 46.
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Some United States Supreme Court Justices acknowledge that the idea of a
“traditional family” is no longer the norm. Although some Justices stick to a “continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history and solid recognition of the basic
values that under lie our society,”39 other Justices acknowledge that family relationships
may develop in unconventional settings.40

Statistics support the Justices who

acknowledge nontraditional family arrangements. During 2002, the birth rate in Kansas
increased, while the marriage rate decreased.41 This led to the largest number of out-ofwedlock births ever reported in Kansas.42 Furthermore, as the population aged and the
baby-boomers began to reach retirement, Kansas experienced a consistent increase in the
number of deaths per capita.43 Together, these trends have a close relationship with
probate law and explain the increased potential for situations like Waldschmidt, where
estranged, long-forgotten, or illegitimate children may become estate claimants.

This

leads to one conclusion – if the definition of “family” changes, the law that deals with
family must change too.
Recent changes in the law with regard to familial rights44 and the societal shift
away from the traditional idea of family reflect a lessened stigma of bastardization,

39

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-123 (1991) (Justice Scalia arguing for the plurality and citing
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)).
40
Id. at 133 (Justice O’Connor concurring).
41
During 2002, there were 39,338 births in Kansas, representing a birth rate of 14.5 per 1,000 population.
This was a 0.7 increase from the 2001 rate of 14.4. Meanwhile, in 2002, the marriage rate (7.3) decreased
16.1% from the 1992 rate of 8.7. 2002 KAN. VITAL STATISTICS, KAN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T.
42
Between 1992 and 2002, the out-of-wedlock birth ratio increased by 26.7%. The number of out-ofwedlock births in Kansas reached a record high in 2002 at 12,129. This represented 30.8% of all Kansas
births, the highest ever reported. Id.
43
There were 24,968 resident deaths recorded in Kansas during 2002, an increase of 1.5% from 2001. The
Kansas death rate in 2002 was 9.2 deaths per 1,000 population, which was 9.5% higher than the national
average. Id.
44
In both Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), the court
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause deems the right of illegitimate children to inherit equivalent to
the right of legitimate children. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (recognizing the due process
rights of putative fathers); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977) (recognizing that there is a freedom of
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because both society and the law have come to accept illegitimate children in
nontraditional family arrangements.45 The Waldschmidt decision, however, demonstrates
that although some areas of the law with regard to parental rights attempt to keep pace
with changing societal trends, probate law does not. The Kansas Probate Code’s reliance
upon the Kansas Parentage Act and Ross, exhibits a lapse in the handling of tough
probate cases and a reluctance to embrace the lessened stigma of bastardization. Such a
contention becomes apparent in cases like Waldschmidt, where courts revert to a best
interest of the child analysis rather than a reliance on scientific accuracy and testator
intent. Thus, in order to align the judiciary with changing societal trends, courts should
become less concerned about the bastardization of a presumed legitimate child, and more
willing to leave the child, at least temporarily, as the heir of only the mother.46
A mechanism for achieving this goal, which closely relates to the societal
acceptance of nontraditional families, is courts’ recognition of the usefulness and
admissibility of genetic testing in resolving issues of biology.47 In 1982, the Kansas
Court of Appeals accepted genetic testing as sufficiently established in the scientific field
to be admissible evidence on paternity.48 At a minimum, if the blood type of the mother
and child are known, then one can determine what possible blood types the father must

personal choice in matters of family life); Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing that the private
interest of a father in his children warrants protection).
45
Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 125
(1996); see also, Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, 166 N.J. 340, 357 (2001) (stating
“the social opprobrium once associated with being a child born out of wedlock has dissipated”).
46
Id.
47
The American Medical Association and the American Bar Association acknowledge the reliability of
human leukocyte antigen testing to prove paternity. Tice v. Richardson, 7 Kan. App. 2d 509, 512-13
(citing Seider, Who is the Father? HLA Testing Provides a Sure Answer to This Question – If Courts Would
Only Listen, 3 FAM. ADVOC. 13, 14 (Fall 1980)); see also, State ex rel. Hausner v. Blackman, 233 Kan. 223
(1983).
48
See supra note 47 and accompanying text citing Tice, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 512-13.
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have.49

With the use of genetic testing, such as human leukocyte antigen testing,

however, it is possible to both prove and disprove paternity with 99.9 percent accuracy.50
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court stated, “as far as the accuracy, reliability,
dependability – even infallibility – of the [genetic] test are concerned, there is no longer
any controversy.”51 Therefore, a genetic test could reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of
spurious estate claims.

Yet in Waldschmidt, the court ignored scientific accuracy.

Decisions like this show courts’ willingness to accept genetic testing as admissible
evidence, but unwillingness to rely upon it as determinative of the truth.
Perhaps the unwillingness to rely upon an accurate determination of the truth has
gone on too long.

Traditionally, courts have followed the law rather than blood.52

Amongst the fifty states, there are stark differences in the handling of heirship challenges
when paternity is at issue: there are states with uniform probate codes, states with
uniform parentage codes, states with both uniform probate and parentage codes, and
states with no uniform code.53 Thus, current state law is incapable of uniformly handling
the fundamental changes in family structures and inheritance claims.

As seen in

Waldschmidt, someone could live their entire life, die, and then have a court decide that
the person they thought would inherit their fortune will be forced to settle for a smaller
piece of the pie because of judicial decisions that ignore objective evidence.

It is

therefore essential to the integrity of the probate system, that the courts not be “burdened
by the ambiguity of statutes or the overloading of the judicial machinery,” but instead be

49

Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7 (1981).
Tice, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 513.
51
Little, 452 U.S. at 6-7.
52
Brashier, supra note 45, at 222–24.
53
E. Donald Shapiro, Stewart Reifler & Claudia L. Psome, The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future
Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1992-1993).
50
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provided a tool that can more swiftly and accurately determine the rights of all parties.54
Given the changing face of family arrangements, reliance on scientific truth, namely
genetic testing, may be the only tool that can uniformly resolve difficult cases.
IV. WALDSCHMIDT IMPROPERLY EXPANDED

THE

BEST INTEREST

OF THE

CHILD

STANDARD TO ADULTS AND IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTESTATE ESTATE
Based on the increasing occurrence of nontraditional families, the advent of
genetic testing, and the establishment of how situations like Waldschmidt occur under
Kansas law, this article will now discuss the Waldschmidt court’s improper expansion of
the best interest of the child standard to adults and in the context of an intestate estate.
First, applying the best interest of the child standard to an adult, as done in Waldschmidt,
improperly expanded the Ross decision.

The Ross opinion itself, as well as other

persuasive authority, supports the contention that an adult child lies outside the scope of a
Ross hearing and that the various factors considered during a Ross hearing do not apply
to an adult. Second, applying the best interest of the child standard in the context of an
intestate estate, as done in Waldschmidt, improperly expanded the Ross decision.
Intestate succession may require the determination of heirship and therefore paternity, but
use of the best interest of the child standard in this context ignores the separate and
distinct purposes of the Kansas Probate Code and Kansas Parentage Act.
A. A Ross hearing should not apply to an adult.
Applying the best interest of the child standard to a thirty-three year old woman in
Waldschmidt improperly expanded and wrongfully interpreted the Ross decision. The
term “child,” as used in “best interest of the child,” should be understood to include
“minor children” and exclude “adult children.” Support for this contention comes from
54

Id.
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the Ross opinion itself.

The Ross court distinguished minors from adults by

acknowledging that a minor child’s “perception of time is different from that of an
adult.”55 Ross also gave a court the discretion to protect a child, presumably unable to
protect himself or herself, from warring parents.56 It is therefore nonsensical for a court
to apply a Ross hearing to an adult; doing so would assume that an adult is incapable of
protecting himself.

Such an assumption contradicts the rights and responsibilities

afforded adults in society and under the law.
The circumstances attendant to a minor and an adult are starkly different and
therefore necessitate a different rule.

Facts ascribable to most adults support this

contention: adults may no longer live in their hometown, adults will likely have an
established career, and adults will perhaps have a family of their own. Furthermore, a
close read of the leading cases imposing the best interest of the child standard57
demonstrates the limited factual scenario to which the best interest of the child standard
applies. Each of those cases involved the parental rights of a putative father where there
was already an established relationship between the “minor child” and presumed father.58
Waldschmidt, on the other hand, involved a dispute over intestate assets between a
rightful heir and a questionable “adult” heir. Thus, the circumstances of these leading
cases are distinguishable from any situation involving the determination of an adult’s
paternity.

55

Ross, 245 Kan. at 602 (recognizing that the concept of time differs between minors and adults).
Id. (“The child is placed in jeopardy whenever a parent’s claim for the child is based solely or
predominantly on motives to score over a warring partner after divorce . . .”).
57
Ross, 245 Kan. 591; McDaniels, 108 Wash.2d 299; C.C., 406 Mass. 679; Ban, 168 Ariz. 196.
58
Ross, 245 Kan. at 592; McDaniels, 108 Wash.2d at 301-02; C.C., 406 Mass. at 680; Ban, 168 Ariz. at
198.
56
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Distinguishing minor and adult paternity actions is not a novel idea. In 1998, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals decided Tedford v. Gregory, a case where an adult woman
brought an action against her presumed biological father to determine paternity and seek
retroactive child support.59 The Tedford court recognized that the best interest of the
child standard invariably applied to “minor children” and not adults.60 The court relied
on Ross in analyzing the purpose behind the best interest of the child standard and noted
that the standard applies, “where the child is young and has already established a close
emotional bond with the presumed father, and where the trial court determines that it
would be detrimental to the child’s welfare to compromise the continuity of that
established relationship . . .”61 Analyzing the reasons for the best interest of the child
standard, the Tedford court held that the standard was applicable in a paternity action
only when the child involved in the proceeding was a “minor” and had developed a close
emotional attachment to the presumed parents.62 Arguably, the facts of Tedford differ
from Waldschmidt, but the application of a best interest of the child analysis to an adult
comes to bear in both.
Other Kansas cases, not following the Tedford rationale, illustrate the confusion
over whether a Ross hearing applies to an adult. In 2000, the Kansas Court of Appeals
decided Ferguson v. Winston, where the presumed father sought an adjudication of
paternity with regard to an “adult child.”63 The trial court in Ferguson ordered a genetic
test without first holding a Ross hearing, a decision consistent with the Tedford

59

Tedford v. Gregory, 125 N.M. 206, 959 P.2d 540 (1998) (holding that the best interest of the child
analysis applied to minor children only and not adults).
60
Id. at 545.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 546.
63
Ferguson v. Winston, 27 Kan. App. 2d 34, 35 (2000).
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rationale.64 The appellate court stated, however, that they “cannot distinguish this case
from Ross,” and held that a Ross hearing must be conducted before the ordering of a
genetic test. It is hard to say whether age played a part in the trial court’s decision not to
apply a Ross hearing, but the appellate court’s reversal of that decision failed to properly
recognize the scope and intent of Ross. The appellate court’s finding that Ferguson was
indistinguishable from Ross is facially flawed: Ross involved the paternity of a minor and
Ferguson involved the paternity of an adult.

Similarly, in Estate of Teeter, another

Kansas case determining the paternity of an adult, the court discussed the utilization of
genetic testing and the provisions of the Kansas Parentage Act, but the court never
addressed the necessity of a Ross hearing.65 However, because the case is still pending, it
is unknown whether this court will also distinguish the Tedford rationale.
Following Tedford makes sense: the considerations used during a Ross hearing
are consistent with the interests of a minor child and not an adult child. The Ross hearing
considerations encompass three themes: (1) protecting the emotional and physical
stability of the child’s environment, (2) analyzing the parent’s motives for potentially
disrupting family harmony, and (3) avoiding the impact of bastardization.66

These

themes, however, do not relate to an adult in the same manner as they relate to a minor
child. If a genetic test reveals the presumed father is not the biological father there would
undoubtedly be an emotional impact on any child regardless of age, but the protection of
family stability that the best interest of the child standard seeks to afford is significantly
64

Id.; see also, Wilson v. Wilson, 16 Kan. App. 2d 651 (1992) (reversing a trial court for failing to conduct
a Ross hearing with regard to the paternity of a seventeen-year-old). Ferguson and Wilson raise the issue of
whether the best interest of the child standard is applicable when a child becomes an adult, or almost an
adult.
65
Estate of Teeter, 2004 WL 944029 (Kan. Ct. App. April 30, 2004) (unpublished opinion reversing the
entry of summary judgment and holding that genuine issues of material fact remain).
66
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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less when that child is an adult.67 When a child becomes emancipated, the emotional and
physical bond between the child and parent becomes more distant, because an adult child
is likely no longer dependent on his or her parent. Consequently, it would be a stretch of
the imagination to think that warring parents would use an unimpaired adult child as a
pawn in any domestic relations dispute.

It is also difficult to imagine that the

bastardization of an adult would have the same impact as the bastardization of a minor
child, especially considering the lessened stigma of bastardization and the societal trend
towards acceptance of nontraditional family arrangements.68 In reality, an adult, perhaps
one who has moved away from his parents, has his own career, and has his own family,
would only be minimally impacted, if at all, by the stigma of bastardization when
compared to the impact on a minor child.69 Thus, the considerations used during a Ross
hearing were created with minors in mind and not adults.70
B. A Ross hearing should not apply in the context of an intestate estate.
The increasing number of nontraditional families has led to frequent paternity
challenges during the determination of heirship.71 Several cases in particular illustrate
paternity challenges with regard to estates and trusts.72 As early as 1923, in In re
Tinker’s Estate, the parents of a decedent challenged the paternity and heirship of a child
67
See Tedford, 959 P.2d at 546 (holding that the best interest of the child standard is applicable only when
a minor child has established a close emotional bond with the presumed parent).
68
See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
69
Contrast the weakened stigma of bastardization with regard to an adult and with regard to a child. In
Jensen v. Runft, 252 Kan. 76, 79 (1992), the impact of bastardization was discussed with regard to a sevenyear-old boy living in a rural area. The paternity action filed in his home county did not use anonymous
initials to identify the parties. The court stated that all the information regarding the minor child’s paternity
was available, and the child would be left to face his peers, who were fully versed of his parental situation.
Consequently, the court ordered a genetic test.
70
See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
71
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
72
In re Tinker’s Estate, 91 Okla. 21 (1923); In re McMurray’s Estate, 114 Cal. App. 439 (1931); Green v.
Long, 547 A.2d 630 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1988); In re Estate of Olenick, 204 Ill. App. 3d 291 (1990); In re Estate
of Raulston, 805 P.2d 113 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990); Estate of Trew, 244 Neb. 490 (1993); Parker v. Parker,
313 S.C. 482 (1994); Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, 166 N.J. 340 (2001).
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based on the child’s premature birth.73 Methods of challenging heirship became more
sophisticated in Estate of Trew, where the siblings of the decedent filed motions
requesting an order compelling the decedent’s alleged children, who had suffered the
divorce and subsequent remarriage of both parents, to submit to genetic testing to prove
their legitimacy for purposes of intestate succession.74 Additionally, in a bitter dispute
over the $350 million Johnson & Johnson Corporation fortune, children, grandchildren
and great-grandchildren of the corporation’s founder have been locked in paternity
challenges as they attempt to exclude each other from the family trust.75 Hence, whether
dealing with estates valued in the millions or just the passing of the family farm, judicial
decisions in cases like Waldschmidt have direct impact on the future of estate
administration. Setting a bad precedent in one case has the potential to change the
distribution of millions of dollars, not to mention the assurances that estate planners,
lawyers, and citizens rely on for structuring asset distribution upon death.
Current uniform laws, such as the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Parentage
Act, do not adequately address paternity challenges during heirship determinations.
States vary widely with respect to statutory treatment of these types of situations. The
Uniform Probate Code, adopted in sixteen states, contains a provision that defers
challenges of paternity to state parentage statutes.

The provision provides that for

determining heirship, “the parent and child relationship may be established under [the
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Tinker’s Estate, 91 Okla. 21 (1923) (holding that under the Oklahoma statutory definition of
“descendants,” the parents of the decedent were without standing to challenge paternity); see also, Estate of
Raulston, 805 P.2d 113 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990).
74
Estate of Trew, 244 Neb. 490 (1993) (holding that the recognition of paternity from a prior divorce and
child custody was a final adjudication of paternity and therefore estopped the challenge of paternity during
the probate proceedings).
75
Trust Created by Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, 166 N.J. 340 (2001).
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Uniform Parentage Act] [applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory reference].”76
The issue, however, becomes even more complicated because not every state has adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act.

Consequently, there are essentially four categories of

statutes in this context: (1) states with both the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform
Parentage Act, (2) states with the Uniform Probate Code but no Uniform Parentage Act,
(3) states with the Uniform Parentage Act but no Uniform Probate Code, and (4) states
with neither uniform law.
First, those states with both the Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Parentage
Act have all adopted the proposed uniform probate statute that defers heirship
determinations of the parent-child relationship to the Parentage Act,77 leaving these states
with potentially the same problem that arose in Waldschmidt. Second, those states with
the Uniform Probate Code but no Uniform Parentage Act have widely differing
provisions, which potentially lead to a menagerie of problems. The various state statutes
in this category provide for deference to a state created parentage code,78 deference to the
Uniform Act on Paternity (predecessor to the Uniform Parentage Act),79 deference to
presumptions of paternity provided for in the probate statute,80 or deference to a prior
adjudication of paternity by clear and convincing evidence.81 Third, those states with the
Uniform Parentage Act but no Uniform Probate Code, such as Kansas, are more difficult

76

UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-114 Parent and Child Relationship; see also, UNIF. PROBATE CODE §1-201(5)
& (32) (defining “child” and “parent” with reference to their determined status under the laws of intestate
succession provided for in the Uniform Probate Code).
77
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-11-114(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§524.2-114(2) & 524.2-109(2); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §45-2-114; MONT. CODE ANN. §72-2-124(1); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §560:2-114(a); N.D. CENT.
CODE. §30.1-04-09(2-3).
78
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §14-2114(A); ALASKA STAT. §13.12.114(a).
79
UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-114(1).
80
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §700.2114(a-b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §29A-2-114(c); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§732.108(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §2-109(2).
81
S.C. CODE ANN. §62-1-109(2); IDAHO CODE §15-2-109(b); NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2309(2).
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to categorize. The statutory provisions vary between no provision for dealing with
paternity challenges during heirship determinations,82 the allowance of genetic testing to
determine the parent-child relationship,83 deference to the Uniform Parentage Act,84 or
deference to a prior adjudication of paternity by clear and convincing evidence.85
Finally, those states with neither the Uniform Probate Code nor the Uniform Parentage
Act each have a unique way of handling paternity challenges during heirship
determinations.

For example, the Oklahoma probate statutes have self-contained

presumptions of paternity, the Missouri probate statutes allow for deference to prior
adjudications of paternity by clear and convincing evidence, and the Georgia probate
statutes allow for the judicial resolution of the identity of heirs with genetic testing.86
Thus, the difference between the states demonstrates the inability to uniformly handle
situations like Waldschmidt and the need for a modern uniform statutory scheme that is
current with societal trends and technological advances.
The decision of the Waldschmidt court brings the differing views on paternity
challenges during the determination of heirship to the forefront. Particularly, in Kansas,
the application of a Ross hearing in the context of an heirship determination ignores the
separate and distinct purposes of the Kansas Probate Code and Parentage Act, and
disregards testator intent. The focus of probate relates to wills, intestacy, administration
of estates, and the distribution of assets.87

The preliminary sections of the Kansas

Probate Code provide that the probate statutes may be used to “determine the heirs,
82

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§33-1-8 & 33-1-1; NEV. REV. STAT. §§132.055 & 132.085.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2123.01, 2105.17, 2105.25 & 2105.26.
84
WYO. STAT. ANN. §2-4-107(a)(iii); CAL. PROB. CODE §6453; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §42(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §3B:5-10;
85
DEL. CODE ANN. §12-508(2); ALA. CODE §43-8-48(2).
86
OKLA. STAT. ANN. §84-4-215; MO. ANN. STAT. §474.060; GA. CODE ANN. §§53-2-20 & 53-2-27.
87
UNIF. PROBATE CODE OF 1969, Preamble.
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devisees, and legatees of decedents.”88 Cases dealing with both testate and intestate
estates illustrate that the testator’s intent is the primary concern of probate law. The
traditional rule in the interpretation of wills holds that the function of the court is to
ascertain the testator’s intent and to then carry out that intent.89 Other states, which have
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, have provisions delineating the purpose of probate as
a way to “discover and make effective the intent of the decedent in distribution of his
property.”90 As was previously discussed, however, the Kansas Probate Code defers
determinations of heirship to the Kansas Parentage Act.91 Thus, the Kansas Probate Code
is not the mechanism used to determine all heirs, devisees, and legatees. Instead, the
Kansas Parentage Act, a body of law that does not correspond with the purpose and intent
of probate, is the mechanism used in some heirship determinations.
The scope of the Kansas Parentage Act, although not explicitly stated in the
statutes themselves, is quite different from the scope of the Kansas Probate Code. The
stated purpose of the Parentage Act is to determine the rights of children, parents, and the
state; thus, the Act focuses on child support, custody, and other family law matters as
opposed to the Probate Code, which focuses on determining testator intent.92 Therefore,
determining heirship by way of the Kansas Parentage Act and its imposed Ross hearing
makes little sense and ill serves the objectives of the Kansas Probate Code.
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KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-103(a)(5).
Estate of Winslow, 23 Kan. App. 2d 670, 672 (1997); see also, In re Estate of Mildrexter, 971 P.2d 758
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that if testator’s intent can be ascertained then no extrinsic evidence is
admissible to vary the intent); Matter of Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
“public policy recognizes that testator’s intent reigns supreme.”); Bradley v. Jackson’s Estate, 573 P.2d 628
(Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the intent of the testator is the controlling factor).
90
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §1-102(b)(2).
91
See supra note 10. It is of note that the determination of heirship in Waldschmidt reached the Kansas
Parentage Act and Ross in a slightly different manner, because the alleged daughter instituted a paternity
action on her own accord.
92
KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-1110 et seq.; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT OF 1973; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT OF 2000.
89

Tyler E. Heffron

19

The idea that a Probate Code should supercede the Parentage Act and not defer
heirship determinations is not a novel theory. Several cases have addressed whether a
state’s Probate Code should apply to the determination of paternity when a claimant
attempts to inherit from an intestate estate. Although these decisions were limited to
narrow holdings that the statute of limitations in the Probate Code supercedes the statute
of limitations in the Parentage Act, they also provide strong support for separating the
Probate Code and Parentage Act. In Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, for example, a thirty-one
year old claimant sought to prove paternity for purposes of intestate succession under
New Jersey’s Parentage Act.93 The Wingate court held that the New Jersey Parentage
Act’s statute of limitations did not bar the probate claim.94 The court stated, “The
Parentage Act and the Probate Code are independent statutes designed to address
different primary rights. The purpose of the Parentage Act is to establish ‘the legal
relationship . . . between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents, incident to
which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.’ Child
support is the major concern under the Parentage Act. The purpose of the Probate Code,
on the other hand, is to determine the devolution of a decedent’s real and personal
property.”95 In Lewis v. Schneider, the Colorado Court of Appeals also found that the
statute of limitations in the Uniform Parentage Act did not apply to a determination of
heirship.96 Similarly, in In re Nocita, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that for
purposes of determining paternity in an heirship situation, the court should apply the
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Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 149 N.J. 227, 229 (1997).
Id. at 242-43.
95
Id. at 238 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§9:17-39 & 3B:1-3).
96
Lewis v. Schneider, 890 P.2d 148 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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Probate Code and not the Parentage Act.97 These cases suggest that the purpose of the
two bodies of law caution against deference to Parentage Act procedures in a probate
case.

Rather, Probate Codes should institute a separate methodology for determining

paternity.
V. A SOLUTION TO WALDSCHMIDT
As demonstrated in Part IV above, the Ross best interest of the child standard is
inapplicable to an adult and in the context of an intestate estate. Cases like Waldschmidt
exhibit the changing idea of what “family” means. At this point, however, it should be
quite clear that the decision of the Waldschmidt court to apply a Ross hearing to an adult
and in the context of an intestate estate is not an appropriate application of current law to
changing trends in society.
The reasoning in Ross supports the contention that the best interest of the child
standard was never intended to apply to an adult. Accordingly, the Waldschmidt court
would have been well advised to consider the Tedford rationale, which explicitly held the
best interest of the child standard inapplicable to adults. Reliance on Tedford and the
intent of the Ross decision draws further strength from a review of the considerations
used during a Ross hearing. Some of the best interest considerations may relate to an
adult, but the overall focus of these considerations is directed at “minors.”98 Conducting
a Ross hearing for an adult is both nonsensical and in defiance of the idea that an
unimpaired adult is fully capable of handling his own life. This article establishes that
the best interest of the child standard determines who is in the best position to be

97
98

In re Nocita, 914 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. 1996).
See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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responsible for a minor child’s welfare, whereas reaching the age of majority brings with
it a duty of responsibility for oneself.
Deferring paternity challenges during an heirship determination to the Kansas
Parentage Act ignores the intent and purpose of the Kansas Probate Code. The Parentage
Act is in place to govern domestic relation issues such as divorce, custody, and child
support, and a Probate Code is in place to distribute assets in a manner consistent with
testator intent.

Thus, the Probate Code’s deference to Parentage Act principles is

misplaced. To this end, requiring a Ross hearing prior to ordering a genetic test under the
Kansas Parentage Act has no useful application in probate proceedings. The application
of this doctrine only frustrates the efficiency and efficacy of probate. Although, without
utilization of Parentage Act principles, the Kansas Probate Code must find a workable
solution to cases like Waldschmidt.
One option for finding a workable solution involves looking at law outside
Kansas. Particularly, Georgia appears to be one step ahead of other jurisdictions, or at
least has an enticing and unique body of law for handling heirship determinations. The
Georgia Probate Code provides, “the identity or interest of any heir may be resolved
judicially upon application to the probate court that has jurisdiction by virtue of pending
administration . . .”99 At this point, and at least for purposes of this article, there are two
bodies of law in Georgia that Kansas would be wise to consider – judicially ordered
genetic testing and equitable legitimation.
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GA. CODE ANN. §53-2-20 (“Resolution of identity or interest of any heir”).
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As recently as 2002, Georgia enacted a probate statute that allows the use of
genetic testing to resolve the heirship challenge of any party in interest to a decedent.100
The Georgia legislature enacted this statute in reaction to various circumstances,
including a dispute of blood relationship in the context of an intestate estate.101 The
statute attempts to “clear up confusion and prevent delay in the settlement of estates,”
problems that previously existed because of the lack of statutory provisions for
disinterment and genetic testing to determine heirship.102 The statute provides that,
“when the kinship of any party in interest to a decedent is in controversy . . . a superior
court may order the removal and testing of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples from
the remains of the decedent and from any party in interest whose kinship to the decedent
is in controversy for purposes of comparison and determination of the statistical
likelihood of such kinship.”103 Such an order is only granted upon a motion for good
cause shown and accompanying supportive affidavits describing a reasonable belief that
the kinship is questionable.104
Alternatively, Georgia codified the equitable legitimation doctrine.105 Equitable
legitimation stands for the idea that an out-of-wedlock child can inherit from his father by
establishing that he is in fact the child of the deceased father and that the father intended
that he share in the estate.106 The claimant child must meet two evidentiary burdens: (1)
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GA. CODE ANN. §53-2-27 (“Disinterment and DNA testing where kinship of any party in interest to
decedent is in controversy”); 10 GA. JUR. DECEDENT’S ESTATES AND TRUSTS §6:48.5.
101
Gregory Todd Jones, Disinterment and DNA Testing: Providing for Court Order for Disinterment and
DNA Testing in Certain Cases Where Kinship of any party in Interest to a Decedent is in Controversy, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 347, 348 (Fall 2002).
102
Id. at 347.
103
GA. CODE ANN. §53-2-27(a).
104
GA. CODE ANN. §53-2-27(b)(1-2).
105
GA. CODE ANN. §53-4-4(c) (“Inheritance by children born out of wedlock and their offspring”).
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James C. Rehberg, Wills, Trusts and Administration of Estates, 47 MERCER L. REV. 387, 392 (Fall
1995).
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clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father, and (2) clear and
convincing evidence that the father intended for the child to share in the father’s intestate
estate in the same manner in which the child would have shared if he had been
legitimate.107

The doctrine of equitable legitimation, first annunciated in Prince v.

Black,108 stands for the proposition that an illegitimate child can still inherit from his
father’s intestate estate if he can meet the two evidentiary burdens. To take this one step
further, just three years after Prince v. Black announced the equitable legitimation
doctrine, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Simpson v. King and held that genetic
testing could be used to meet the clear and convincing evidentiary burden.109
These two Georgia probate statutes directly address the issues attendant to
situations like Waldschmidt. The statutes recognize the changing meaning of “family,”
the advent of scientific technology, and the impact of these trends on probate law,
without reliance on Parentage Act principles such as the best interest of the child
standard. Thus, Kansas should amend the Probate Code to rectify the misapplication of
law that occurred in Waldschmidt and create a new standard for future paternity
challenges during heirship determinations, based in part on the Georgia statutory scheme.
First, eliminate from the Kansas Probate Code any means by which a paternity
challenge during an heirship determination could be adjudicated by Parentage Act
principles.

Second, amend the Probate Code to include provisions similar to those

adopted in Georgia. The new probate provisions should provide that when the paternity
or kinship of any party in interest to a decedent is in controversy, a probate court, upon a
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GA. CODE ANN. §53-4-4(c)(1-2); see also, In re Estate of Burton, 265 Ga. 122, 123 (1995).
Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79 (1986).
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motion for good cause shown, may order the genetic testing of a decedent and the person
whose paternity or kinship are in controversy. If the genetic test results in a positive
determination of paternity or kinship, the party should be allowed to inherit pursuant to
already existing distribution provisions.

If the genetic test results in a negative

determination of paternity, then equitable provisions may be applied by the court to
ensure the application of testator intent. In the latter instance, the burden will be on the
party claiming heirship to present clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended for them to inherit from the intestate estate, despite the finding of non-biology.
The burden will then shift to the challenging party to rebut the presentation of evidence
by the claimant and demonstrate that equity should not allow the claimant to inherit from
the estate, in accordance with the finding of non-biology.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusion that a Ross hearing is inapplicable to an adult and in the context of
an intestate estate, that the Kansas Probate Code should not defer challenged heirship
determinations to the Kansas Parentage Act, and that the Kansas Probate Code should be
amended to include new provisions for the determination of heirship, creates several
beneficial results. It would modify the law to keep pace with societal changes in the
meaning of “family” and fully utilize the recognition of genetic testing as determinative
evidence regarding blood relationships. It would shift the law away from reliance on
human determinations of equity and move it towards recognition of scientific truth.
Finally, it would ensure the nexus of the Kansas Probate Code, testator intent, is at the
heart of the outcome in cases like Waldschmidt and not the nexus of the Kansas
Parentage Act, the best interest of the child.
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